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PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY. By Piero Calamandrei. Translated by 
John Clarke Adams and Helen Adams. New York: New York University 
Press. 1956. Pp. xv, 104. $4.50. 
One of the most noteworthy characteristics of civil procedure in the 
United States, and of the great movement for procedural reform which has 
recently had so much success, has been its isolation and inbreeding. The 
American procedural scholar has been necessarily expert as to the varying 
procedures in American jurisdictions-though he tends to avoid Louisiana 
with a shudder-and he is familiar also with English experience, at common 
law, in chancery, and more lately, under the Judicature Act. But this 
enumeration virtually exhausts the sources to which he is accustomed to 
resort. With a few notable exceptions, students in this field have made 
little effort to enrich civil procedure by a comparative analysis of other 
domestic systems of procedure which might well be suggestive, such as the 
procedures used in criminal courts, administrative agencies, admiralty and 
arbitration.l Nor have most of our reformers shown much awareness of or 
interest in procedural developments in countries which do not enjoy the 
common law.2 
In part this insularity may result from the same factors which limit 
comparative law study generally in the United States-language barriers, 
and the imagined difficulty of understanding an entirely different legal 
tradition, have long deterred all but the most stout-hearted in fields other 
than procedure. But I believe there is a special factor applicable only to 
procedure. Too often civil procedure is approached in a technical, voca-
tional manner rather than as a subject of deep theoretical interest. The 
practitioner is generally content to know only the code of his own state, 
and his limited interest has been reflected in much-but by no means all-
of the teaching and research about this subject. 
Dr. Calamandrei's little book, now made available in an extremely 
felicitous translation, demonstrates very forcefully how much we have been 
1 One conspicuous exception is VANDERBll.T, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PRO· 
CEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1952), which combines civil procedure with criminal 
procedure in a single set of teaching materials. 
2 The handful of books and articles on procedures in other than common-law juris-
dictions are cited in Cr.ARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., §3 (1947). Judge Clark has been one 
of the few Americans to treat procedure jurisprudentially rather than vocationally. 
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missing by these limitations on American procedural research. The author 
is professor of civil procedure at the University of Florence, a successful 
practitioner, a sometime member of the Italian Parliament, and, according 
to Edmond Cahn's foreword, "enjoys an illustrious international reputation 
in the law and philosophy of civil procedure." (p. v) 
The author demonstrates in these few pages how well-merited that 
illustrious reputation is as, with keen insight and no little charm, he 
analyzes the central problems of procedure. Though his examples are taken 
usually from the civil law systems with which he is most familiar, the prob-
lems discussed are universal. The issues Dr. Calamandrei considers are 
well-known in American procedural reform and his thoughtful and pro-
vocative comments are fully applicable here. 
He begins with an examination of the relation between legal procedure 
and judicial custom: a code takes form as a rationalization of existing 
practices, but the code, in turn, has meaning and application only as it is 
interpreted and used by lawyers and judges who vary the code in the light 
of their particular needs and habits. ". . . The judicial process as it is 
written in the Code is only an empty mold, which produces different 
results according to the particular substance poured into it. . . . In this 
way procedures duly written in the law may become atrophied and dis-
appear in practice, while, conversely, methods of procedure can spring up 
in practice that are unknown to the written law." (pp. 10-12) The American 
reader thinks immediately of the "cold, not to say inhuman, treatment of 
the infant code" attributed to New York judgesa as compared with the 
liberal interpretation of the same code in, for example, Minnesota, and he 
notes how the pre-trial conference has become a useless, time-wasting pro-
cedure in state courts in Chicago, while splendid results are being achieved 
under a virtually identical rule in the federal courts in the same city. 
The next three lectures examine the role of the judge. The first of these 
considers the notion that the judge is a mere automaton applying an im-
personal "rule of law." Dr. Calamandrei's answer is unequivocal: " ... in 
every interpretation of the law there is a re-creation, and individual in-
spiration is the decisive factor." (p. 31) There follows a discussion of the 
"independence" of the judge, which the author rightly praises as the ulti-
mate goal toward which all reform must aspire. "Independence" is defined 
as meaning both freedom from selfish motives and freedom from hierarchic 
control, and it is shown how difficult the latter element is to achieve so long 
as the government has administrative responsibility for the courts and 
judges are motivated by desires for promotion. Dr. Calamandrei makes the 
original and imaginative suggestion that the traditional secrecy of the 
judges' chambers does a disservice to justice, and may tend to diminish the 
3 The famous phrase is that of Chief Justice Winslow in McArthur v. Moffet, 143 
Wis. 564 at 567, 128 N.W. 445 (1910). 
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independence and sense of responsibility of the judge; without committing 
himself, he notes the interesting practice of the Mexican Supreme Court, 
where the judges hold their conference in open court. 
The author concludes his discussion of the role of the judge by con-
sidering the practice of ·written opinions, which he regards as important 
and useful even though recognizing that the opinion is a rationalization of 
a decision already intuitively made. Consideration of the role of reason in 
procedure naturally leads the author- to the question of the jury. The jury 
system, abolished under the Fascist regime in Italy for political reasons, has 
not been re-established, and Dr. Calamandrei suggests that this is wise: 
" ... the traditional jury system, in which the jurors were called on to judge 
without giving the reasons for their verdict, seems to have been fashioned-
as experience has borne out-for the very purpose of encouraging the jurors 
to judge unreasonably; and so, rather than the faithful expression of the 
social conscience, their verdict often appeared to be the triumph of pure 
irrationality, an irrationality that was all the more dangerous in that it 
was not susceptible to appeal." (pp. 56-57) The argument is an interesting 
one, and it will surely appeal to many Americans at the present time when 
the desirability of retaining the civil jury is being much discussed. But it 
may be suggested that Dr. Calamandrei, on this point has discounted unduly 
·the presence of important values in the democratic process other than rea-
sonableness. The author makes frequent and suggestive use of an analogy 
between civil procedure and parliamentary procedure. l£ that analogy can 
be used here against him, it may be argued that, subject to minimal con-
stitutional bounds, a legislature is not required always to act rationally nor 
must it give a reasoned opinion to support its every action. The jury, which 
like the legislature is representative of community sentiment, should be 
similarly free to express the collective conscience of the community regard-
less of the dictates of pure logic. 
A chapter on the dialectical aspects of judicial process centers attention 
on the relationship of the parties to each other and to the court. The 
author considers this relationship to be the "most precious and typical 
characteristic" of modern civil procedure. (p. 74) He makes a strong 
argument for preservation of the adversary system, and he is concerned for 
the freedom and independence of the parties. A dominant theme in current 
American reform is to centralize power over the course of the proceedings 
in the hands of the judge, and correspondingly to diminish the role of the 
parties and their lawyers. Already procedures have been widely-and, I 
think, wisely-adopted which give the judge virtually uncontrolled power 
over the form and method of trial4 and of pre-trial proceedings,5 and a 
4 See, e.g., Rules 42 (b) and 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5 Under the federal rules and similar state systems, the judge is given almost complete 
freedom to determine such vital matters as: whether to hold a preliminary hearing on 
various important defenses or postpone them until the trial, F.R. 12 (d); whether to have 
a pre-trial conference, F.R. 16; and the scope of discovery, F.R. 30 (b), (d). 
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similar power over the admission of evidence and the use of expert witnesses 
looms on the immediate horizon.6 Dr. Calamandrei probably would deplore 
this movement. He discusses proposals during the final years of the Nazi 
domination of Germany by which it was planned to abolish the freedom of 
the parties and to provide a procedure where all initiative would emanate 
from the judge. It is apparent that the author regards such proposals as 
typical of the totalitarian regime in which they were made, and that he 
considers them unsuitable for a democracy. 
The final chapter is concerned with the respect for the individual in 
the judicial process. It considers such topics as the practical meaning of 
the equality of citizens before the law, the manner in which financial in-
equality between the parties may prevent them from obtaining equal 
treatment in the courts, and the great problem of the right to counsel, 
which the author considers "the most important indication of respect for 
the individual in the judicial process." (p. 93) 
If there is one fundamental theme which emerges from these lectures, 
it is that judicial procedure has its roots in, and is a miniature of, the kind 
of government which a nation enjoys. I have already noted the fruitful 
use Dr. Calamandrei makes of the analogy between the judicial and parlia-
mentary processes. The desirability of mutual confidence among the three 
parties to the judicial debate, the importap.ce of respect for the individual, 
the requirement that judges be independent, the role of custom in relation 
to the codes-all of these are elements of civil procedure as western nations 
have known it, but they are also essentials in our broader commitment to 
the ideals of parliamentary democracy. 
To the American student of procedure, fresh from bitter debates on 
such earth-shaking topics as whether a defendant should be given twenty 
days or thirty to file an answer in an action, such a grand conception as this 
is both startling and illuminating. But this is the level on which we must 
think if we are ever to achieve a real procedural jurisprudence and make 
our codes something more than an unrelated collection of arbitrary rules. 
Charles Alan Wright, 
Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Texas 
6 See, for example, the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence, endorsed by the Ameri-
can Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
and the American Bar Association. Rule 45 of these rules would permit the judge to 
exclude otherwise competent evidence if he believed its probative value was outweighed 
by its tendency to confuse the jury. And rules 59 to 61 would authorize the judge to 
appoint his own "impartial expert." 
